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Summary findings
Oic  of the most complex challenges of infrastructure  All things considered, they conclude, this staff
privatization is its impact on employment. Often (but not  reduction program was reasonably successful.  The
always) private operators'  main approach to cost-cutting  aimed-for improvements in productivity were achieved
is labor redtuction.  Private operators cannot afford the  without major problems through a government-
low levels of labor productivity typical in public  stimulated and -sponsored combination of early
conmpanies  if they are to be competitive and to deliver on  retirement and voluntary retrenchment. The
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reliable infrastructure services. But labor issues are so  the number of involuntary retrenchments it wanted to
sensitive that government's early, direct involvement is  make, which helped sustain the momnentum  created by
seen as a way to address what potential investors see as a  the government's  prompt implementation of its own
risk of privatization as well as to address the social  decisions and the fair treatment of workers.
concerns of the population,  including the workers.  The main problems came from the underestimate of
When Brazil's Federal Railway was privatized, the  time needed to agree on the strategy for implementing
team in charge of privatization made a significant effort  the training and outplacement programs. Informal
to complement the incentive for voluntary reduction  evidence suggests that most workers found new  jobs
with an elaborate menu of training options. Estache, de  before many of the training programs were available.
Azevedo, and Sydenstricker describe this experience in  And the strategy adopted gave workers a good incentive
dealing with labor redundancy problems. They discuss  (one month's pay) to sign up for the courses but
the dcsign of the program, highlight the connections  provided little incentive for workers to show up, since
between its components, and assess the program's  they were paid up front.
achie  cments.
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1. Introduction
As infrastructure privatization experiences in developing countries progress, there is
increasing evidence that their  impact on  employment is one  of  their most complex and
politically  challenging  elements. In many cases-although not always-  the main approach  to
cost cutting that is adopted by private operators is indeed labor reduction.  Because labor
productivity is generally very low in public companies, private operators cannot afford to
maintain these levels of employment if  they expect to be competitive with potential new
entrants into the sector or if they are to deliver on their contractual obligations to provide
cheaper and more reliable infrastructure services.  The high sensitivity of the labor issues
increasingly  results in governments  being involved in the initial stage of the labor reduction
programs.  This direct and early involvement  can be viewed as a way for governments to
address  some of  the  risks  associated with  privatization that  are  perceived by  potential
investors. It is also a way for governments  to ensure that the social concerns of the population
at large, as well as the workers  who could lose their jobs.
The desire to ensure the proper handling of the social needs of the workers is one of
the main reasons why the team in charge of the privatization of Brazil's railways made a
significant  effort to complement  the incentive  for voluntary reduction with an elaborated menu
of training options. This paper provides an overview of this experience in dealing with labor
redundancy problems.  It discusses in  some detail the overall design of the program and
highlights the interconnections  between its various components.  The paper also provides a
first assessment  of the program's achievements.
The paper is organized as follows: Section  2 is an overview  of the historical evolution
of Brazil's Federal Railways  (RFFSA)  and of the factors that lead to its privatization; Section
3 discusses  the main estimates  of the staff retrenchment  needs; Section 4 describes the profile
of the railway workers; Section  5 explains  the overall strategy with which the specific  program
was build; Section 6 presents the various elements of the program that aim to address its
efficiency  and social concerns; Section  7 presents the main achievements  so far; and Section 8
concludes  with some lessons.
2.  Historical  Background:  The Path to Privatization
Brazil's  Federal  Railways, RFFSA,  was  incorporated in  1957, as  a  state-owned
corporation  under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transport (MT).'  RFFSA is the result of
the  merger  of  eighteen  independent railways,  built  mostly  by  British  and  French
concessionaires,  beginning  in the nineteenth  century. The incorporation  of RFFSA was part of
a National Development  Plan to promote efficiency through direct government  intervention in
the operation  of the economy.  Unfortunately,  over time, the lack of a business plan, coupled
with  constant government intervention in  RFFSA's  decision making process, as  well as
political interference with the company's employment policy,  led to  years of  insufficient
'RFFSA:  REDE FERROVLRIA  FEDERAL SOCIEDADE ANONIMA: Brazil's  Federal Railway2
earnings and inadequate capital investment. RFSSA ended up with 160,000 employees  at its
peak.  Moreover, RFFSA was burdened by  excess capacity and  uneconomic rail  lines,
particularly in the Northeast.  A substantial portion of RFFSA's tracks were well below the
level of minimum  efficiency, and failed to earn revenues in excess of its variable costs, at then
current rail rates.
On several occasions, the Federal Administration  struggled to restructure the railway
system. Strategies have included issuing new debt, reducing fixed costs (and an earlier effort
to reduce the labor force), reorganizing  inter-city services and, above all, capital restructuring
through transferring the suburban passenger operations (and their corresponding operational
losses)  to a separate  entity (CBTU).  Despite all these efforts, RFFSA has consistently  shown
losses in its balance sheet.  Since attempts to restructure RFFSA under the public umbrella
were all failing, Brazil started looking at the privatization  experiences  of other Latin American
countries such as Argentina and Chile.  The successes of the programs in those countries,
combined with the increasing  difficulty of maintaining  cost-effective  operations in Brazil lead
the government  to decide to privatize  the railroad services, under a new regulatory  regime, so
as to foster effective  competition  with the trucking industry. To implement  this new policy, in
1992, the government  included RFFSA in the National Privatization  Program.  This was the
first major privatization  of public infrastructure  services in Brazil.
In  order  to  enable the  privatization to  take  place in  a  competitive manner,  the
government:  (a) submitted  to Congress a bill of law ("Sistema Nacional  de Viacao" or SNV),
which allows a substantial  reduction of the railroads which, in accordance  with the previous
applicable legislation, were due to remain under the interest of federal jurisdiction; and (b)
established  a new railway regulation, to enable the private operators to discontinue operations
of branch lines not within the SNV, as well as operations of those lines under the SNV which
were shown to  be uneconomic.  The government then started to  work on  selecting the
restructuring  model for the sector. In view of the geographic  characteristics  of Brazil and the
size of the federal railway network, as well as the significant cross-regional differences in
RFFSA's traffic, this restructuring  was to be a key determinant of the overall success of the
efforts to introduce  competition  in the sector.
The restructuring decision ended with the following: RFFSA's operations were to be
divided into a  number of  vertically integrated regional systems.  The concession for the
operation and maintenance  of these systems for a period of thirty years would be publicly
auctioned  to private enterprises. A minimum  price was to be established  for the concession  of
each regional system.  The auction price for a regional system was to be paid in accordance
with a  payment schedule described in  the Public Offer.  The amount collected from the
concessionaires  was to be divided between the National Treasury (5% from the concession)
and RFFSA (95% from leasing the operational assets).  The federal administration, as the
company's controlling shareholder,  deliberated that the net proceeds of the auctions would be
used to reduce RFFSA's indebtedness.
The specific  privatization  model prepared by BNDES, Brazil's National Economic  and
Social  Development  Bank, followed  those lines and divided the RFFSA railway system  into six3
Regional Areas.  The Regional Areas were then independent systems, serving different
markets, with  no  or  limited inter-connections and inter-charge traffic.  The market and
financial analysis  of each of the Regional Areas carried out by RFFSA and BNDES indicated
that all such Areas were economically  feasible, and therefore attractive  to the private sector. In
economic  term, the success was thus almost guaranteed.  One potential stumbling block was
the labor opposition,  and this one of the factors  that explains the main efforts put into the labor
redundancy  packages  discussed  below.
3.  Assessing  the employment  reduction  needs
The implementation  of the proposed  privatization  plan clearly required some degree of
reduction in RFFSA's employment. Although RFFSA had already made significant  progress
in reducing its employee headcount, the company's labor productivity continued to be low.
RFFSA had reduced its total staff from about 110,000 in 1975 to about 42,000 in May 1995.
This reduction led to a substantial  increase in labor productivity, from 250,000 to almost 1
million net  ton-km per  employee.  However,  this  labor  productivity continued to  be
insufficient, not  only when compared to  similar North American companies, but also to
recently restructured  and privatized  railways in Argentina  and Chile.  The strategy  to deal with
this excess labor had to be subtle since there were significant  differences  in labor productivity
across RFFSA's regions (see Table 1) and cuts across the board would not make sense.
TABLE 1: LABOR  PRODUCTIVITY  INDICATORS  (1994)
;  Regional Areas  Employees  I000 net-ton-km,/mployee 3
Northeast  4,402  210
Souwteast  9,982  2,041
South  10,208  884
West  2,655  722
Tubario  351  274
Mdwest  8,608  800
The solution  was to come up with new cost reduction  plans for each of the six Regional
Areas to  be privatized, based on  new  operational procedures, with  redundant activities
identified  by job categories.  This was essentially a very meticulous  job that required a very
detailed study based on the best international  practice.  The redundancy  estimates  were to be
conservative since the  idea was to  avoid second-guessing  what the  concessionaire would
actually need, while avoiding  forcing the concessionaire  to have to re-recruit "fired" workers
as had been the case in Argentina  and the UK.  In addition, the staff remaining  at the company
at the time of transfer to the private operator had to be sufficient to avoid interruptions in
service.  To ensure this, a detailed analysis  was conducted  by the Regional Managers  to assess
both the staffing  needs for each function  and the number of excess workers.  By the end of this4
analysis,  RFFSA's  management had reasonable estimates of the staff reduction  needs in each
Regional Area.  This process led, in May  1995, to an employment reduction target number of
20,000  workers.  Between May  and  September  1995.  1,953 workers  voluntarily decided  to
leave the company, so that by the time the first concession was announced in September  1995,
the new reduction target number was 18,047, as seen in Table 2.
TABLE  2: MINIMUM\  STAFF REDUCTION  REQUIREMEtNTS
|  . Sr  l  | |  X g4,446  1,909  41.9
0  |  . iN li  i  i  i  C12,039  5,575  46.7
367  30  8.3
10,385  ~~4,624  _45.0
1,209  ~~590  48.8
2,792  _  772  21  8.2
41,991  ~18,047  43.0
4.  Profile of RFFSA's employees
To minimize the social cost of layoffs, RFSSA had to have a good understanding of the
profile  of its  employees.  This  required  aL  detailed study that was carried  out  as part  of  the
preparation  for  the World  Bank project.  A detailed  analysis  of the  characteristics  of each
regional labor market and outplacement opportunities for each excess worker  was conducted.
The study covered the employee's  age, experience  and education level,  compared  to  similar
characteristics  in  the regional  labor market  where  the  redundant  workers  employees  would
have to compete for a new job.
The study revealed that the two main characteristics  of Brazil's  labor market are:  (a)
the  modest  qualifications  of  its  labor  force;  and  (b)  its  capacity  to  generate jobs  of  poor
quality.  The poor qualifications of the country's  labor  force reflects  the low level of formal
schooling  and  the  low  quality  of  basic  education.  Professional  training  is  not  entirely
effective,  even for  the most  educated workers.  Moreover,  training  oln the job  is  often not
sufficient,  due  to the high  turnover  in the labor market.  There  are frequent  short spells  of
unemployment.  In many cases, these spells result in lower wages when workers return to the
market.  There  is also an  increasing trend toward  switching from  the status  of employee to
independent business-person.
In spite of some similarities, such as the low level of education, the profile of RFIFSA's
employees differed from the rest of labor market (See I'able  3).  The average rail worker  was
about 41  years  old,  had  about eighteen years  of  service  in the  same company,  didn't  have
much education and  had  little or excessively  specialized  skills.  The  average  worker  in thegetieral labor market is at least six years younger.  RFFSA's  workers were paid between ten
and thirty percent more then the average worker in the respective labor market.
Table 3: PROFILE OF RFFSA'S LABOR FORCE (NOVEMBER 1995)
45  18  67  25  7  1,215
iMi4west  40  17  38  54  8  1,186
4 1  18  38  52  9  I  1,656
0S~h  40  18  66  - 26  8  1,106
- -Nxbaro  a40  16  33  47  20  1,232
41  1  17  9  1  88  3  1,302
The emerging concern was then that without some assistance, many of the rail workers
declared redundant were likely to find  it difficult to compete in the labor market in the short
run.  Even in the event these workers did manage to reenter the market,  chances would be that
they would be paid less.  The view at that tirne was that what was needed was enough training
to reduce the cost imposed by specialized job  experience and the lack of formal education.  A
teatmi  of advisors from various training institutions was convened by RFFSA to prepare a menu
of  options for affected employees to choose from  and to design training packages that would
meet the employees'  needs.
5 - A Generic approach to jointly  address efficiency and social concerns
The next step was for RFFSA to work on building a staff reduction program that would
address  its social concerns as well as the efficiency requirements of the restructuring process.
This meant that the legally-required severance payments (which,  on average, corresponded to
the euuivalent of ten months salary) was not enough.  In addition, the program  had to fincd  a
way of encouraging early retirement to reduce the average age in the company,  and it had to
provide  some  incentives for  voluntary  retirement  to  minimize  the  number  of  workers  that
would have to be fired.  These incentives had to be complemented by training programs,  based
on  regional  employment  opportunities,  and  outplacement  assistance  that  would  reduce  the
personal drama of the workers declared redundant.
These ideas were  transformed  into the following specific  goals of the  staff reduction
program.  The program  was to:  (a)  reduce RFFSA's  employee headcount  by  about 18,000
over  three vears,  in addition to the 4,000  employees who had applied for  early retirement  in
1995; but it also had to: (b) increase staff productivity through training  and outsourcing; and
(c) minimize the social cost of the adjustment through  appropriate severance payments.  The6
privatization team recognized that these targeted reductions in labor force were  by no means
final.  Once all Regional Areas  had been  privatized,  the organization  of each system  would
probably  change  and would  likely  to  lead to  additional  reductions  in  staff,  changes in  skill
mixes and improved productivity.  However,  during the first  12 months of the concession, the
concessionaires  would  have  to  ensure  the  same benefits  that  RFFSA  awarded  to  dismissed
workers.  After the first twelve month period,  laid-off workers would only  be entitled to the
amounts established by law. 2
It was clear that the private operators were to make their own adjustments,  which were
expected to be minimal.  In fact, the optimal strategy might have been to leave all decisions to
the private concessionaires.  However, this would not be consistent with the political reality of
the country and the particular  industry.  About 80% of the company's  workers were affiliated
with one of the seven unions active in the sector.  These seven unions are comprised of only
railway workers.  All of the unions initially were  essentially against privatization and refused
to participate  in the reorganization  process,  despite the fact that they actively participated  in
briefing meetings and public hearings held for the employees.  Leaving it to the private  sector
to  negotiate  with  the  unions  would  undoubtedly  have  affected  the  fiscal  return  of  the
privatization,  and  in some cases, could have limited the interest of private  enterprises  in  the
process.  The advantage of the proposed  strategy  was that the bulk  of the adjustments were
made before  the privatization,  which  minimized  the risk  of  later  conflicts.  It  also  had the
advantage of ensuring that the social concerns were properly addressed.
6. The Details of the Overall Incentive Program
The specific details of the overall incentive program built on the information discussed
above.  The program had five components:
a) Incentives for early retirement;
b) Severance packages for voluntary separation;
c) Training;
d) Assistance for  outplacement; and
e)  Severance packages  for dismissed workers
(a) Incentives for Early Retirement
In January  1995, with the implementation of a plan of incentives for early retirement,
RFFSA  began its  efforts  to  reduce  its  staff.  The main  eligibility requirement  was that  the
employee had to be at least 50 years old and legally eligible to retire as of December 31, 1998
when  all  Regional  Areas  would  be  transferred  to  private  concessionaires.  The  proposed
benefits under this program were:
2 A potential problem with this sequencing was that the private concessionaires could rehire employees who had left the company under the
program.  The labor law does not allow restrictions to recruitment.  The only contractual restriction applied by RFFSA was that any worker
joining their incentive program  would not be able to work for RFFSA again.7
*  Payment  of  the  worker's  net  monthly  salary  for  a  period  of  six  months  while  the
appropriate paperwork was being processed by INSS (the National Social Security Agency).
This plan included retroactive  payment of the retired  employee's  pension benefits  for the
same six month period;
*  If the paperwork was not ready after the six month period, RFFSA would continue to pay
the amounts referred to above, but in the form of an interest-free loan to be reimbursed by
the retired employee after the date of his/her actual retirement;
*  Payment of both the employee's  and the employer's  match  to the RFFSA's  pension  plan
(REFER),  for up to  five years,  until the early retiree reached the age of 55, which is the
minimum  age  to  be  eligible  for  payments  under  REFER.  This  strategy  reduced  the
incentive for  people between 50 and 55 to  stay on the job  until they become eligible for
payments under REFER.  Payments would be made at the time of actual retirement.
In  1995,  5,154 employees volunteered to  retire  under  this plan.  Eligible employees
were able to participate in this plan up to the time when the private concessionaires took over
the operation  of the respective Regional Area.  After that point,  the  concessionaires would
determine the pension plan which  would be  offered to their  employees,  and  RFFSA would
have no more actuarial obligations.
(b)  Incentives for Voluntary Separation
The  package  for  voluntary  separation  was  meant  to  ensure  that  the  employee who
would willingly leave the company would be ready to  start his/her  own business or could re-
enter the market  without having to  suffer a  significant reduction  in his/her  previous  salary.
Another important goal of the incentive package was to comply with a federal guideline which
requires that cost reduction programs of publicly owned enterprises do not lead to increases in
the  country's  unemployment  rate,  which  could  threaten  its  social  stability.  Eligibility  for
packages were on a first -come-first-serve basis, within specified limits by job category.
The key  to  this  program  was training  those  workers  affected by  the  staff  reduction
program.  For workers  interested in  starting their  own business,  the program  provided  the
necessary tools to comply with the legal and administrative requirements of self-employment.
Employees targeted by the program had also  to  select a  specific professional  training.  For
those not interested in starting their own business,  the design of the training  programs  were
targeted to ensure that, after their training, workers were equipped with the tools in demand in
their  respective  regional  markets.  Employees  also  received  assistance  in  their  search  for
employment.  All  employees were  eligible  on  a  first-come-first-serve  basis  except  for  the
following:
*  employees who decided not to be associated with the employee savings organization FGTS
(which is optional);
*  employees who were eligible for normal retirement;8
*  employees  entitled  to  their  job  because  of  their  status,  tenure  or  responsibilities  (union
leaders  and  representatives  of  employees  in  internal  commissions  to  prevent  accidents
(CIPAs).  These  employees  could  choose  to  resign  from  their  responsibilities  and  thus-
become eligible for the package;
*  pregnant employees;
*  administrative level employees; and
*  temporary employees.
The actual separation from the company took effect within thirty days of the acceptance
of  the  employee's  application  to  join  the plan.  During  that  period,  the  decisions  on  the
specific benefits under  the program  were taken and processed.  They included calculation of
the financial benefits,  standard legal rights  and incentives,  and the preparation of the training
programs  which  were  to  be  started  within  six  months  of  the  approval  of  the  employee's
adhesion to the plan.
Financial Incentives - The financial incentives depended on each employee's  number
of  years  of  service.  To  assist  the  employees  in  their  decisions,  each  RFFSA  office  was
equipped with  software which gave information on all the incentives offered to each worker,
accompanied by a simulation of the benefits eventually  afforded.  The incentives were based
on four to twelve months  salary, depending on the number of years  of service.  To become
eligible,  a  worker  would  have to  have at  least six years  of  services to  the company.  The
financial incentives granted are shown in Table 4 below,  and were structured as follows:
. For workers with 6 to 25 years of service,  the incentives were calculated as an increasing
geometric progression from 4 to 12 months of salary with  19 increments of 1.0595 for each
year of service between these two points;
. For workers with 25 to 30 years  of service,  the incentives were calculated as a decreasing
geometric progression from  12 to 6 months of salary, with 5 increments of 0.8705 for each
year of service between these two points.
TABLE  4: FINANCIAL  INCENTIVES
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Employees  who decided  to join the voluntary separation  incentive  program would also
benefit from: (a) an authorization  to continue living in houses/apartments  owned by RFFSA
for up to twelve months (only for those already living in such houses/apartments);  and (b)
pension plan payments (REFER) by RFFSA for twelve months, unless the employee  decided
to  withdraw the  savings accumulated in  that plan.  The average value of  the  financial
incentives  to each worker was of roughly US$ 8,000, in addition to an average of about $
18,000 worth of legal termination rights, calculated on the basis of the number of years of
service, age and contribution  to various compulsory  savings accounts.  The incentive  package
was designed to avoid traumatic family situations, which have been observed in many labor
force reduction programs.  The average duration of unemployment  varied from six to nine
months in most regions. The incentive  package  intended  to pay a full salary to workers during
much of their job search period.  In addition, the package  included  training to help reduce the
job search period, thereby reducing  the probability of social problems.
(c)Training Program
To provide an additional incentive to workers to attend training  sessions, the incentive
program specified that an amount equivalent to one month's  salary would be subtracted  from
the severance package granted an the employee who did not attend the training program.
The regional labor market in each Regional Area was studied in detail by labor market
specialists of a major research and analysis institution - IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econ6mica
Aplicada), as well as by members of the Economics Department of the Rio de Janeiro Catholic
University  (Pontificia  Universidade  Cat6lica-PUC).  The  task  of  these  two  reputable
institutions was to determine the nature and composition of the market,  relative to supply and
demand.  This  information was used  to  help  organize the training  and  determine what  was
necessary to  achieve optimal results  from  the company's  efforts  to  help participants  of  the
incentive program reenter the market;
Brazil does not have an institution specialized in retraining the unemployed.  There are,
however,  three major professional/technical  education centers which can provide this service:
SEBRAE,  SENAI and SENAC.  All three  are specialized in training  employed workers  and
have branches throughout Brazil.
*  SEBRAE  (Brazilian  Support  Service to Small Companies). SEBRAE's mission is to foster
the incorporation  of small and medium size ventures, which are known to be responsible  for
the creation of a great deal of job  opportunities.  Therefore,  SEBRAE offers training  for
people interested in becoming independent entrepreneurs.  It provides extensive consulting
services  regarding  business,  accounting,  financial  and  legal  aspects  related  to  the
incorporation  and conduction  of small and medium size enterprises.  Applicants must have
at least a secondary  degree;10
*  SENAI ( National Service for  Industrial Training), sponsored by National Industry
Confederation.  SENAI offers technical training for industry workers interested in further
improving or updating their technical/professional skills.  Most applicants have a secondary
degree; and
*  SENAC (National Service  for Commercial  Training), sponsored  by National Commercial
Confederation.  SENAC concentrates on training workers who are interested in the services
area.  Typical attendees have a secondary diploma.
SENAI  and  SENAC  are financed  by a  tax called  Social Security Contribution  Tax,
levied on all the core business payroll of all legal entities.  SEBRAE is financed by a similar
tax  levied  on  the  companies'  entire  payroll.  These  institutions  are  typically  retained  by
companies interested in retraining their employees.  However,  individuals who are not linked
to a specific corporation may also sign up for specific training classes by paying the applicable
fee.
Upon RFFSA's  request, the three institutions agreed to develop new training programs
or adapt their already existing programs to the needs of RFFSA's  workers.  Their average cost
per  person  (including housing,  food and transportation) is  as follows:  SEBRAE: R$ 2.000;
SENAI:  R$ 2,408  and  SENAC: R$  320.  The  training  courses  offered by  SEBRAE  and
SENAI had an average  duration of  150 hours.  The average  duration of  SENAC's  training
courses is only 40 hours,  due to a lower degree of specialization of the services (e.g.,  hotel
services, driving,  waiting,  etc.).  SENAI also  includes an information and procedure  kit to
assist trainees in starting their own business.  The largest demand was for SENAC's  training
program,  since the type of training  offered was well in line with the current demand in  the
labor market,  where the fasted growing  needs are  in the services sector.  The total  cost of
RFFSA's  training program  was estimated at about $10.5  million.  An additional $2 million
was needed to train the company's residual staff.
(d)Outplacement Assistance  Program
The  staff reduction program  also provided job  search assistance to  those  employees
leaving  the  company,  including  resumes  preparation  and  the  provision  of  information  on
employment  opportunities.  Employees  also  were  assisted  with  addressing  problems
concerning the negotiation of new employment contracts.  A similar type of  assistance was
offered to those trying to start their own business or create cooperatives.  Employees leaving
the company were not required to attend training classes to benefit from this service.
RFFSA created  a  data bank  which  indicated all workers  who had left  the company
under  the program  and  those  firms  potentially  interested in  their  professional skills.  This
service was made available to participating employees for a period of up to eight months after
training.  Specialized firms  with representation  in all Regional Areas  were hired  to provide
this service.11
The World Bank was concerned that the  outplacement assistance program would  not
attain optimal  results  due  to  low rates  of  attendance  at  the training  courses  and  the poor
learning skills of the attendants.  The World Bank then suggested that the training institutions
(SENAI,  SEBRAE and  SENAC) be paid on the basis of success.  In other words,  a part of
their fees would only be paid in the event that the trained worker was awarded a job in his or
her  field  of  training.  However,  this  idea  could  not  be  implemented for  several  reasons,
including: (i) the training agreements had  already been executed before the World Bank was
invited to support the Reduction In Force  Incentive Program.;  (ii) in order for a contingency
fee system to be put into place, the contractual negotiations would have to include a reduction
in the retainer fees and provide for the balance to become due on a success basis, which would
certainly mean reopening the lengthy discussions and creating a new agreement; and (iii) being
a state-owned company, RFFSA's  management had  (and still has) little,  if any,  flexibility to
renegotiate aspects of agreements which had already been approved and executed.
As  an  alternative,  the  World  Bank  suggested  that  the  firm  retained  to  assist  the
outplacement assistance program could be entitled to an additional 10 to 20% success fee for
every employee who managed to secure a job  for a full year that was at least as good as the
one previously held in the company.  Unfortunately, this idea failed to address the issues that
impaired the application of the World Bank's first suggestion.
To  ensure  that the training  program  would  effectively help employees  who had  left
RFFSA reenter the market, the World Bank requested that the company retained to assist the
modeling  of the  outplacement program  became responsible  for  its  implementation.  It  was
believed that a success fee would provide additional incentive to the outplacement assistance
firm, which would then become more committed to the program's  success.  RFFSA's  internal
reorganization team would supervise and coordinate the overall process.
(e)Severance Package
In the event that the voluntary separation and early retirement incentive programs  did
not  reach the targeted staff reduction  number, RFFSA would have to  start laying-off excess
workers.  It  was clear that this part of the staff reduction  program would not be concluded
before the privatization.  In any event, RFFSA would monitor the staff reduction process even
after the privatization, up to  the time when the target  numbers were  achieved.  The workers
dismissed under  this  third phase would receive,  as severance payment,  80%  of the amounts
afforded by workers who voluntarily left the company.  Dismissed workers would, however,
enjoy all other benefits provided to the others,  including outplacement assistance and training.
There would be an incentive for laid-off workers to  sign up for training,  since their financial
package would be subject to the same penalties applied to the others (i.e. one month's  salary,
if they decided not to participate in the training).
There  was concern  about the professional  and  social profiles  of  the  workers  being
dismissed.  The company intended to keep the best staff possible.  Selection of workers to be
laid off was based on the following criteria:12
*  record of attendance;
*  frequency of penalties or suspensions;
*  overall performance evaluation by the employee's  immediate supervisor; and
*  family situation (e.g. marital status, number of children).
These workers would still get an average of R$ 17,751 worth of legal severance rights,
plus an average of R$ 400  in incentives, twenty percent  less than the workers who left the
company voluntarily.  Added to the cost of training, the severance package would amount up
to  about R$  10,000,  plus  legal  severance  rights,  which  represented  six to  eight  times the
average monthly wage in most regional labor markets.
(f) - Sequencing and Timing
This  program  was  implemented  separately  in  each  region.  Initially,  prior  to  the
privatization,  RFFSA  implemented the  early  retirement  and  voluntary  separation  incentive
programs,  which were offered only to select job categories.  Then, the company started to lay
off employees  with  redundant  activities--the involuntary  reduction.  At  this  stage,  RFFSA
offered a severance package  to these redundant workers that  was equivalent to  80%  of the
benefits paid to employees who voluntarily left RFFSA.  The second tier of the program took
place  after  the  privatization  and  bore  the  same  conditions  afforded  by  workers  laid-off
involuntarily.  The level of headcount reduction allowed was capped by the concession bidding
documents.  Compensation packages for additional layoffs beyond the specified limit would be
the concessionaire's  responsibility.  By the  end  of  1995,  RFFSA  had  already  reduced  its
employment by over 4,000, mainly through early retirement incentives, at a total cost of about
US$ 40 million.
7.  The implementation  and the achievements  so far
All  six  Regional Areas  have now been  privatized  and  some  lessons can already  be
drawn  from  the  experience.  The program,  as  it was  initially  conceived,  suffered  several
adjustments up to  the time  of its  actual implementation,  but  these changes were  constantly
communicated to  the  workers and the unions.  Indeed, throughout the process,  the reform
strategy included a major effort to inform the workers of their rights and options so that they
could make the best choice.  Before implementation, RFFSA distributed to every employee a
small book explaining the program.  Later,  several presentations  on the program were made
by members of the company's central administration and by members of SENAI, SENAC and
SEBRAE,  who presented  the professional training  programs.  As  initially planned,  various
labor secretaries attended many of the presentations,  but did not participate in the program.
All of RFFSA's employees, as well as union representatives, were invited to the presentations.
By that time, the unions were already aware that the program had reached a point of no return.
Thus, the management of the company and union leaders argued at length over several aspects
of the program, but there was no opposition to its implementation.13
The  company  handed  out  a  program  adhesion  form  and  provided  computerized
simulations of the benefits ensuing from the program.  As previously mentioned, eligibility for
the  program  was  on  a  first-come-first-serve  basis  and  the  acceptance  of  an  employee's
application would have to be authorized by the employee's  direct team leader.  Curitiba was
the site where the company refused the largest number of applications for the program.  While
the  reduction  target  number  for  that  site  was  of  300  employees,  the  management of  the
program received about 800 applications.
The rest of this section reviews the accomplishments of the staff reduction program in
each one of the categories.
(a) Early Retirement Incentive Program
The early retirement  incentive program was implemented in January  1995. Its success
resulted from the introduction of a major social security reform in Congress when the program
was about to be implemented.  The reform proposed in Congress included drastic changes that
altered the relative value of  the staff reduction  program  for the average  employee.  These
changes were basically made to adapt to the new social security legislation which implied that
eligibility to retire would no longer be based on the number of years worked, but mostly on
age.  This change (formally passed in January 1998) would have meant that many people who
had  worked  for  over  twenty years  and  who previously would have been  entitled to  a  full
pension  would have to have to work for another fifteen to twenty years to  receive the same
benefits.  Since the average worker already had eighteen years of company time, many ended
up opting for early retirement.
This change could not be anticipated at the time the initial design of the redundancy
program was being tested.  Studies made during the modeling and planning stage showed that
the  majority of  RFFSA's  excessive force  would leave  the company through  the Voluntary
Separation Incentive Program.  However,  the fear that adverse changes in the social security
law could jeopardize the retirement income of older workers led to an unexpected increase in
the  number  of  applications  for  the  early  retirement  incentive  program.  In  addition,  the
projections on the number of employees potentially eligible for the early retirement incentive
program  were  based on the time  of  services rendered to  the company,  without taking  into
consideration the amount of time that employees' previously worked elsewhere.  This clearly
underestimated the potential demand for an early retirement package.  The overall adhesion to
the early retirement incentive program showed that a much larger  number of employees had
worked  enough  time  to  retire  in  accordance  with  the  retirement  rules  established  by  the
National Social Security Agency  (INSS).  Table 5  shows the difference between what  was
planned and what actually occurred.14
TABLE 5: WORK FORCE REDUCTION
S  a  |  S  |i  i  i  |  ||  |  |  |  E5,000  11,7710
2 |  |  |  ! !  ! I i  ! i  # |1  3,000°  5,  886
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(b) Voluntary Separation Incentive Program
The voluntary separation incentive program was implemented in the different Regional
Areas,  in  accordance  with  the  privatization  program's  timetable.  The  dates  of  actual
implementation of the voluntary separation incentive program  in the different Regional Areas
and in the Central Administration were as follows:
Feb.  01, 1996 to Feb.  16, 1996_
May 13, 1996 to May 31,  1996
Aug. 19, 1996 to Aug. 02, 1996
L  -2  Oct. 14, 1996 to Oct. 28,  1996
_  _  ~  |Oct.  14, 1996 to Oct. 28,  1996
Oct.  14, 1996 to Oct. 18, 1996;
and Nov. 18, 1996 to Dec. 02,  1996
I  c  t  i  l  Oct.  30, 1995 to Nov. 17, 1995; Jun.  17, 1996 to
Jun. 28, 1996; and Apr. 14, 1997 to Apr. 30, 1997
The planning of the voluntary separation incentive program foresaw its implementation
in three phases.  The last part of the program  would be  implemented after the privatization,
during the transition period in which the Regional Areas were to be managed by both RFFSA
and  the  concessionaires.  The  whole  program,  however,  was  concluded  before  the
privatization.
The staff reduction target number was calculated on the basis of the maximum number
of employees to be absorbed by the concessionaires,  as established in the Privatization Bidding
Documents.  The  number  of  employees  established  for  each  Regional  Area,  the  reduction
target  number  and  the  number  of  employees  actually  absorbed  by  the  concessionaires  are
shown below in Table 6.15
TABLE 6: REDUCTION IN FORCE
Regionaf Area  Maximum Staff To  Staff Actually Absorbed
(C'oncessionairc)  Be Absorbed
_t  W  Sg-l_@  w  ~~~~~1,800  -1,792
*  i i  ii  - ~  ~7,900~~~  7,771l~ 
i  g  _  I  "  | |  X  t  ~~~~6,600  6,241
|  i  - -~~~~~~~~~25-0-  207
l  l  |  ~~~6,900_  6,292
_011  §  i  |  i  ~~~~~1,600  1,409
The difference between the number ot employees due to be absorbed and the number of
employees effectively transferred to the concessionaires reflects the increase in the applications
for retirement,  which is a legal option granted by the applicable legislation to eligible workers,
against which RFFSA could do nothing.
(c) Layoff Program
In order to finally achieve the staff reduction target number, the company had to lay off
eighteen employees at the Central  Administration Office and 367 employees in the Northeast
Regional  Area.  The  large  number  of  layoffs  in  the  Northeast  Regional  Area  was  due  to
structural changes in that system to make it economically feasible.
But as expected,  that did not  end the staff reductions:  the concessionaires  decided to
reduce  employment  even  further.  Indeed,  the  fact  that  the  concessionaires  received  less
employees than what was initially provided for in the Official Bidding Documents did not stop
them from reducing their staff by another  14,000.  The number of separations is summarized
in Table 7.
Table 7: STAFF REDUCTIONS IMPLEMENTED BY THE CONCESSIONAIRES
Regional  Area  Staff Reduction
r______________________________  -- 1,167
I___;__p__est_____________________;__l_  5,355
2,942
- .=utI~  3,913
_  _  _  _  _  -- _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _- _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _v  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  7  8  7
_________________________________14,220(d  'T'raininrg
Imnplemnentation  of the training  program was somewhat troublesome.  The main initial
probitmn was the lengthv negotiations of several agreements with the three training  institutions
and their representatives in the different sites.  This was aggravated by the fact that Brazilian
legislation  requires  state--owned companies  to justify  the execution  of agreements without  a
biddifig process.  which was the case since all parties involved in these agreements were public
enterprises.  In the end, ninieteeni  asreements  were signed between the company and SEBRAE,
while 21 and 12 contracts were signed witth  SENAI and SENAC, respectively.
The  overall  training  rrecord so  far  is  also  lower  than  expected.  Out  of  the  5,886
employees that were eitlher dismissed or voluntarily separated form  RFFSA, 3,046 joined  the
training program.  Thlis  number includes the 997 employees that had been previously trained
by the cwnpany before an agreement was reached on the overall program.  Since each eligible
emplovee could sign up for up to two trairiing colurses, the total number of diplomas awarded
iy  the three institutions was 4,573.
Why did relatively tew workers take the training?  TIhere  are several reasons.  The first
is that the time that elapsed betweeni when the workers left the company and the beginning of
the trafnine. program was often excessive, as seen in Table 8.
S<  t~s  .et  96  Dec  .97.. 
L  1~~''able  8: DELAYS IN IMIPLEMENTING  TRAINING
No  Dec. 96
Mach. 96  Jun.  96
:  M~~~Nay7  96  ;tMay  97
;  t~~~~~~~ept.  96  Dec. 97/
0  0  0  Nov. 96  Dec. 96 
;g  §.g  .........  Nov. 96  )tJun.  96
N~rI~stOct.  96  Oct. 97
The second factor is probably that the financial penalty  imposed on those who did not
apply for  traininmy  was not  correctly  planned.  All  payments  were  made when  the  workers
leaving the company were  asked to  state whether they would apply for training,  which  was
before the training program began.  Since the actual separation took place before the begirming
of the training prograni, RFFSA had no control over those who decided not to attend.
This problenm  would have been solved if the training program had started immediately
atfter the acceptance of the employee's  adhesion to the incentive program and before the actual
separation.  Payt  of the employee's  severance  package  should also have been withleld  until
compietion of the training program.  Unfor-tunately, it was already too late when the problem
was detected.I i
Due to the distribution  of skills among workers the assumptionl was  made during  the
planning of the incentive program that most laid-off or voluntarily separated employees would
prefer to take one of the training courses  coordinated bv SENAC.  the mere  service oriented
training  institution.  The  actual  distributioin of  trainees  among  the  training  institutionis is
described in Table 9.  It shows that most workers were more interested in learning how te r-un
their own business and signed up for SEBRAE.
Table 9: COST AND DURATION OF TRAINING  AT EACH INSTITUTION'
Institution  Average Cost/Trainee (R$)  T  :zj,  Duration  (hou
M  ~X*;2  P  ;  g;iT  '  s tJ  v  1,617.16  16
SENAC  1  . ......  >  1,050.1'2  176
SEWNI  753.73  143
In  April  1997,  the  firm  QUATRE  Consultants  was  retained  by  the  company  to
coordinate the training  program,  under  the  supervision  of RFFSA's  weam.  The consultants
started working on the project on September  17, 1997.
The coordination of the training  program by third parties was suggested by the World
Bank, despite the company's opinion that it was an unnecessary measure.  Staff reorganization
programs  are just  beginning  in  Brazil.  There  are  no professionals  in  this  area  who could
efficiently  do  the job  for  which  the  consultants  were  hired.  It  took  a  long time  betore
RFFSA's  team  managed  to  properly  train  the  consultants,  which  have  now  reachecl  a
satisfactory  level of  efficiency.  RFSSA's  rnanagement  is convinced  that  the work  that  the
consultants  were  retained  to  do  could  have  easily  been  performed  by  in-house  personnel,
therefore saving close to R$ 1 million.
(e) Outplacement Program
The same consultants hired to coordinate the training program were retainedL  to
implement  the outplacement program,  and tiheir volume of activity  has Oeen large,  althouigh
not  as large as expected.  Of the 5,886  employees that were  either  dismissed or  voluntarily
separated from RFFSA,  1,061 joined the outplaceinent program.  The program started with a
three day seminar, organized  in sixteen diffe.rent cities throughout Brazil. in order  to facilitate
the attendance by all the applicants.  There were a total of 36 seminars
Despite  these efforts,  of  the  1,061  applicants,  only  172 former  employees  actually
attended the seminars.  In view of this fact, the company asked (he consultants to mail the 807
books that were used in the seminars to the applicants wV-,  did not attend.  The intention +vwas
to maximize the effects of the outplacement program.  The amiswers  to a questionnaire that was
also mailed to the applicants would allow the program's  management to  send out r6simni6s  to
potentially  interested companies.  So far,  the outplacemenrt  program cotrsultants have sent out
164 resumes. which are also available on the Internet.
In additioni, each traine.  received  a daily  allowance which. on aver-age, came to  R$ 1.1  '16  80.18
(f) Survey of former employees
In order to know what happened to the former employees of RFFSA and to check if the
resources  allocated to  training were effective in maintaining the standard of living,  RFFSA's
management commissioned a  detailed monitoring  in  each region,  based  on field interviews.
RFFSA  retained the Rio  de Janeiro  Catholic University  (PUC)  to conduct these interviews.
This  survey  began  in  January  1998,  in  Sao Paulo.  Eventually,  it  covered  5,334  former
employees who left the company between January  1995 and October 1997 and was distributed
over 600 municipalities.  The reply percentage was over 77%  (including 90% of men) which
is high but not complete because 1,217 workers moved without a trace.  Only seven percent of
the workers covered by the sample refused to cooperate
The forst  survey showed that the average  worker  interviewed is  43  years  old.  The
education level  is quite heterogeneous and higher than the Brazilian average,  with only  1  %
"analphabet"  and 4%  with a  post-graduate  degree.  The majority  (22%)  had a  high-school
diploma.  Almost half (2,301) work on their own and 20% have opened their own business.
Only 18% are employees and 4% are civil servants.  About 13 % are employed illegally.  Most
found the training good but irrelevant to their new job.  About 44% of these employees have
been in their new job  for an average of 13.2 months.  Overall,  they all earn less than when
they were working for the railways.
A more detailed  survey conducted among 675 formers  employee in September  1998
was also  quite  revealing.  Only  10%  where  unemployed  but  they  count most  of  the older
workers  and/or  the  less  educated.  Also  the  salary  structure  had  changed  quite  a  bit.  In
particular,  the survey shows that while 53% of the workers are earning less than when they
were at RFFSA, 27 % and making a better living. In general, the dispersion of wages increased
for that sample.
(g) RFFSA's Remaining Staff Training Program
With  the  privatization  of  RFFSA's  operational  system,  the  company  underwent  a
substantial  modification  of  its  core  business.  To  cope  with  the  changes  and  face  the
company's  new attributions, it was crucial to retrain RFFSA's  remaining staff.  Retraining of
the company's employees began in March 1998 and will end in December 1999
This  retraining program  has been managed  by  a consulting  firm  (De  Consult)  since
December  1997.  In view of the lack of a clear definition by the federal administration as to
what will be RFFSA's  corporate objectives or what the country's  public transportation policy
is,  De  Consult  is  concentrating  its  retraining  program  on  tasks  that  are  now  under  the
responsibility of RFFSA, which are:
*  Administration of the company's indebtedness and receivables;
*  Sale of assets; and19
Monitoring  the use of the operational  assets being used by the concessionaires.
8. Summing  up the main lessons of this experience
All things considered,  this staff reduction  program has been reasonably  successful.  For
now, the main points are probably that the improvements  in productivity  that were aimed for
have been achieved  without  major problems, through a combination  of early retirement  and
voluntary retrenchment  stimulated  and sponsored  by the government  and a willingness  by the
concessionaire  to make quick decisions  on the number  of involuntary  retrenchments  that they
wanted  to implement. The main advantage  of the quick decision  by the concessionaire  was
that it benefited  from the momentum  created  by the prompt government  implementation  of its
own decisions  and the fair treatment of workers.  The companies  could have indeed  waited
until the contractual  twelve month obligation  to pay the same package  as the government  for
involuntary  retrenchment  was over, which would  have allowed  them to only pay the legal
obligations.
The main problems  have come from the underestimation  of the time it was going  to
take to agree on the strategy  to implement  the training and the outplacement  programs. In
addition, the strategy adopted  provided a good incentive  to sign up for the courses (one
month's salary)  but it did not provide much incentive  to workers to show  up, since they were
paid up front.  The informal  evidence also suggests  that most workers found new jobs before
many of the training  programs were available. 4
4 In February 1998, the government  obtained  the authorization  to incorporate  the Sao Paulo railways,  FEPASA,  into  RFFSA and to implement
its concession.  This also involved  a staff reduction  program. FEPASA  had 8,134 workers. Of this total, at least 2,300 were to be declared
redundant  and 1,576 were laid-off, out of which  1,023 asked for technical  assistance,  1,251 asked  for training  and 711 used the outplacement
service.  Since  then,  the concessionaire,  FERROBAN,  has laid off another 1,400  workers.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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